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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and Concise Statement of the Facts
Appellants dispute Respondents' factual account to the extent that it asserts that "CDA
Placer did several times between 2012 and 2014 offer to sell the property to the Nicholsons",
(Respondents Brief at 1, 5, 6-7). While there may have been some references to the possibility
that Kevin Boling, purportedly CDA Placer's real estate agent, would be contacting the
Nicholsons regarding a potential sale, Mr. Boling never followed through with either an offer
from CDA Placer or a solicitation of an offer from the Nicholsons. See Complaint, 12.10-2.12,
2.17 (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 8, 9) and Plaintiffs' Responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15 (R. at Vol. 2,
pp. 164, 165).
Further, to the extent that Respondents' assertions rely on statements from Boling,
Appellants will note that Respondents did not submit any affidavit from Boling, or any corporate
officer of CDA Placer, disputing Appellants' version of the events. This issue was raised at the
original hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the District Court properly excluded
the letters from Boling and the Gardners as inadmissible hearsay (Transcript (Tr.), pp. 8-9) and,
therefore, they are not properly a part of the record in the instant case.
Rather, based upon the information that is on the record herein, communication from
Boling and CDA Placer was sporadic, at best, and there is no indication that, as a matter of law,
CDA Placer performed its agreement to offer to purchase the property. At best, this remains a
factual dispute, to be determined by the trier of fact, and, to the extent that the District Court
relied upon the same in rendering its decision, Summary Judgment was improper.
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With the exception

said factual dispute, the remainder of the Parties' respective

discussions of Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and Statements of Facts from the
standpoint of each party are adequately set forth from each party's perspective in the Parties'
briefs, and, as such, will not be re-iterated herein in the interest of brevity.

Furthermore,

Appellants herein will only directly address certain major issues discussed by the Respondents in
their Brief, and will refer to, and incorporate by reference as though fully set forth herein,
Appellants' Opening Brief with regard to the remainder of their argument.

II.

ARGUMENT

A.
The District Court Did Not Properly Grant Summary Judgment on the
Nicholsons' Complaint.
1.
CDA Placer Did Breach the Agreements Because It Did Not Offer to
Sell the Property to the Nicholsons.

Initially, Respondents argue that the agreement was not breached, and allege that there
were, in fact, offers made to sell the Property to Appellants.

Respondents' Brief at 11-12.

However, as discussed above, the correspondence upon which Respondents rely as proof of this
assertion were stricken at the initial Summary Judgment Hearing. No affidavit from either Kevin
Boling, Elizabeth Gardner, other officer of CDA Placer, or other person who may have been
privy to any alleged meetings or discussion between CDA Placer or Boling and the Nicholsons
has ever been submitted or produced by Respondents during the course of this case. However,
even to the extent that this correspondence was properly a part of the record on Summary
Judgment, Appellants dispute these factual accounts. Complaint, 12.10-2.12, 2.17 (R. at Vol. 1,
pp. 8, 9) and Plaintiffs' Responses to Interrogatories 13 and 15 (R. at Vol. 2, pp. 164, 165). As
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such, there

at a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not CDA Placer

performed the agreement and, therefore, Summary Judgment was inappropriate on that basis.
2.

The Exception to the Statute of Frauds Does Apply.

Respondents next argue that Appellants' claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Respondents' Brief at 13-20. As set forth in Appellants' prior briefing, a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether or not Respondents' conduct estops them from asserting the
Statute for the reasons set forth hereinbelow.
"A [party] who is induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his
own detriment cannot be defrauded by a [party] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare
the agreement invalid." Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
110 Idaho 804, 807, 718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ct. App. 1986). In this case, there is significant
evidence on the record that the Gardners, as agents of CDA Placer, on numerous occasions, reassured Appellants that they would either offer to sell the property to Appellants or purchase the
buildings in the event that CDA Placer elected not to renew the lease. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 7-8; Vol.
2, pg. 160). Respondents did not submit any affidavits which would dispute this claim from any
other person who may have knowledge of these statements/promises (such as Dr. Elizabeth
Gardner).

In reliance upon these re-assurances, Appellants remained upon the property,

continued to renew the lease, and improved and maintained the Property with the express
approval of CDA Placer. (R. at Vol. 2, pp. 163-64).
With regard to Appellants' claim of Estoppel against CDA Placer, the main issue is that of
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detrimental reliance.' Respondents cite and discuss at length a decision from the Massachusetts
Land Court (a trial level court), Slover v. Carpenter, 24 LCR 1 (Mass. 2016), which discusses the
issue of reliance in the rental context, dealing with a similar contractual provision with regard to
written consent to improvements. However, even to the extent that this Court may find a trial
court decision from another State to be persuasive, Respondents note that, in that case, "there
was no evidence that the defendants personally observed the plaintiffs' action and 'silently
acquiesced to their repairs and expenses."' Respondents' Brief at 19. Whereas, in this case, there
is evidence that agents of Respondent CDA Placer not only personally observed Appellants'

action, but expressly approved of Appellants' repairs and expenses. (R. at Vol. 2, pp. 163-64).
See also Hurtubise v. McPherson, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 190, 951 N .E.2d 994, 998 (2011 ).

Again, it is undisputed that Appellants improved the property, and continued to reside
thereon pursuant to an annual lease, when all parties knew that the buildings were not movable
by the time Appellants purchased the same. Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein and in
Appellants' Opening Brief, it remains that there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to
Appellants' reliance upon Respondent CDA Placer's representations. For that reason, Summary
Judgment was not proper, and the decision of the District Court should be VACATED and
REMANDED.

CDA Placer Waived the Requirement for Written Permission to Make
3.
Improvements.

Respondents initially raise the Parol Evidence Rule with regard to Appellants' waiver

I

Respondents' discussion of Estoppel on page l 5appears to pertain to Appellants' estoppel claim regarding IFG's
Counter-claim, rather than CDA Placer.
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argument.

Respondents' Brief at 20.

However, this Court has held that Parol Evidence is

admissible to prove a waiver or estoppeL Mull v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 35
Idaho 393, 398, 206 P. 1048, 1049 (1922). Therefore, the Paro! Evidence Rule does not bar
consideration of extrinsic evidence that may show a waiver in this case.
Next, Respondents argue that the "no waiver" provision was not waived, and attempt to
distinguish Lewis v. Continental Life and Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 355, 461 P.2d 243, 250
( 1969) on the grounds that it was an insurance case. Respondents' Brief at 21. While there are,
no doubt, problems that most commonly arise in the insurance industry context, facts of which
may effect a waiver more often than in other circumstances, there is not a different body of
contract law either in the State of Idaho or under English Common Law or Equity for insurance
contracts as opposed to contracts entered into in other contexts. Like in Lewis, the "no-waiver"
clause in the Lease Agreement was "written by the company for its own benefit and may be
waived by it."

Id.

Given that Respondents have submitted no evidence contradicting

Appellants' representations that the Gardners, as agents of CDA Placer, personally viewed the
improvements, expressed approval of the same, and took no action against Appellants or claimed
a breach of the Lease for the same, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that CDA Placer
waived both the requirement that consent to improvements be in writing, as well as the "nowaiver" provision itself.

Therefore, again, Summary Judgment was not appropriate in this

regard.
4.

Unjust Enrichment and Forfeiture.

Essentially, after arguing at length that the Lease provides no remedy for Appellants in
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the event that the lease is terminated or not renewed, thus forcing the abandonment of their
buildings for which they paid valuable consideration and on which they have continued to pay
taxes, Respondents now argue that the Lease provides an adequate remedy at law, thus
precluding the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. Respondents' Brief at 22-23. However,
Respondents fail to point toward any provision in the Lease that would allow for compensation
to Appellants in the event that they are forced to abandon their property to the possession of
Respondents. It is an uncontroverted fact that, if Appellants are removed from the Property,
CDA Placer's successor-in-interest, IFG, will obtain, for no payment to Appellants, several
inhabitable and usable buildings, which it could then sell, rent, or otherwise from which obtain a
profit. As such, once again, there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the unjust
enrichment claim, and Respondents' were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Respondents next, after reciting several provisions of the Lease which, essentially,
operate to effect a forfeiture of the buildings upon termination, makes a conclusory statement
that "no forfeiture of the Nicholsons' property has happened, so Idaho Code § 45-110 has not
been triggered." Respondents' Brief at 24. This is somewhat perplexing, at Respondents' goal
has been, for some time, to remove Appellants from the Property and retain their buildings for no
compensation. Furthermore, the statute does not require that the forfeiture actually take place
before it is triggered; rather, it states that contracts for forfeiture are void. Id. Therefore, the
cited provisions of the Lease are unenforceable, regardless of when or whether the forfeiture
actually takes place. Thus, again, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the District Court's
grant of the same should likewise be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
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B.

THE

DISTRICT

COURT

DID

NOT

PROPERLY

GRANT

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT ON IFG'S COUNTERCLAIM.
1.

Unlawful Detainer and Damages.

Appellants hereby re-incorporate the arguments as set forth in their Opening Brief, which
Appellants believe sufficiently advises the Court as to their position. Appellants will note,
however, that the Counterclaim was not initially "Verified," with verification supplemented some
time thereafter, and no Motion or Stipulation to Amend their Answer and Counterclaim is of
record herein. See Idaho Code § 6-318.
2.

Sufficiency of Legal Description

While a Counter-claim has been held to be a part of the Answer, as opposed to an
independent pleading, Respondent IFG does not admit in its Answer that the civic address of the
Property was a sufficient legal description. In response to Appellants' allegation contained in
Paragraph 2.2 of the Complaint, "[t]he Property is located at 2867 Prichard Creek Road, at the
site of the old Eagle City settlement," (R. at Vol. 1, pg. 7), Respondent IFG responds: "As to
paragraph 2.2 of the Complaint, admits that the mailing address of the plaintiffs is 2867 Prichard
Creek Road, Wallace, Idaho, but denies that this is an adequate legal description of real property
alleged in the complaint and denies the remainder of the allegations in the paragraph." Answer

I

of IFG Timber LLC and Counterclaim,

17

(R. Vol. 1, pg. 30) (emphasis added). Further,

Respondents point to no authority that otherwise excepts a Counter-claim from what is required
to be alleged had the claim been brought as an independent action, nor do they point to any
authority that would incorporate an allegation from the Complaint, especially an allegation that is
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denied in the Answer.
As such, what was placed before the Court by IFG was: (1) an admission solely that 2867
Prichard Creek Road was the mailing address of the property, with a denial of the "remaining
allegations" of the paragraph, to-wit: that it was located at 2867 Prichard Creek Road, that it was
located at the site of the old Eagle City settlement, and that this was a sufficient legal description;
and (2) an allegation that Appellants were leasing "a portion" of an enormous parcel of land. In
other words, IFG placed the location of the property into dispute by denying the allegation in the
Complaint with regard to the same, and then attempts to rely upon the allegation that it had
denied as support for its counter-claim.
Therefore, the Counter-claim essentially contains no description of the property, other
than a description of a very large parcel of property (likely several hundred, if not exceeding one
thousand, acres) purchased from CDA Placer, and an allegation that Appellants were leasing
some of it, somewhere. Had the Sheriff been provided only with the information contained in
the Answer and Counterclaim, i.e., that the mailing address was 2867 Prichard Creek Road, and
that IFG were entitled to possession of "a portion" of the property it purchased, no reasonable
person could conclude that an executing officer could identify it. The District Court was, then,
in error in granting summary judgment on the counter-claim for the recovery of the same from
Appellants, based solely upon Appellants' allegation in the Complaint, which IFG denied. As
such, once again, the decision of the District Court should be vacated and remanded for further
proceedings.

3.

Equitable Estoppel a&ainst IFG
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Respondents next argue that there is no evidence that IFG had notice of the agreements
between Appellants and CDA Placer and that, for those reasons, Appellants' estoppel claims
should not be applied as against IFG. Respondents' Brief, 29-30. However, there is no affidavit
on record from any agent or representative from IFG stating that IFG had no notice of the
agreements. Therefore, this remains a factual dispute that, on summary judgment, must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,
541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). Under this standard, it is inappropriate to hold that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to IFG's notice of the agreements between Appellants and Coeur
d'Alene Placer and, therefore, summary judgment should have likewise been denied on that
basis.
4,

Motion for Reconsideration.

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the District Court abused its discretion in denying
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
C.

Fees and Costs on Appeal.

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Respondents should not prevail on this appeal and,
further, the Counter-claim was not brought pursuant to Chapter 3, Title 6, Idaho Code.
Therefore, Respondents should not be awarded attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

III.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be
REVERSED, VACATED, and the matter REMANDED to the District Court with instructions
pursuant to the legal and equitable principles set forth hereinabove.
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DATED this 4t11 day of August, 2016.

JAMES McMILLAN,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing to the following by the method indi9ated below:
Michael E. Ramsden/Theron J. DeSmet
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, L.L.P.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorney for Respondents

_lL U.S. Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile to: (208) 664-5884

~~

/~McMillan
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